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It is now widely accepted that the recycling of
surpluses by the private banking system in the 1970s
contributed to maintaining global activity through
sustaining developing country purchasing power.
What occurred in fact was a process of 'massive
transfer' under the aegis of the private sector which
had the effect of partially offsetting the recessionary
impact of the oil price increase. With the onset of the
second oil crisis the capacity of the banking system to
continue with this process was widely questioned;
indeed the European Commission placed on record its
view two years ago that, as contrasted with the period
after the first oil crisis, 'the private banking sector is no
longer enough' [EEC 1981].
It is worth dwelling briefly on the reasons for this:
- there is a concern that, with the total developing
country debt rising to $425 bn at the end of
1981, and with servicing costs exceeding on
average over 20 per cent of their export
earnings, this will inhibit access to banking
credit;
- secondly, there is a concern that country limits
are being approached by the banking system for
an increasing number of developing countries.
Since a very large proportion of bank lending is
concentrated in a few countries - some 12 in
number - the deflationary implications are
serious;
- thirdly, banks are becoming concerned about
the adequacy of their capital in relation to the
total size of their deposits - a point also
specifically made in the Commonwealth Report
[Arndt et al 1980];
- finally, there is the problem of how far the
process of the banks borrowing short and
lending long can be sustained if the confidence
of short-term depositors such as OPEC is
eroded by even a single banking crisis.
Proposals for Recyling in Favour of the
Third World
If this is accepted, the question that arises is what other
surrogates to the private banks' recycling role are now
available. This article seeks to explore the alternatives
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that are open to the international community, and in
particular the EEC. Among the various possible
arrangements, one concerns a specifically EEC
institution, viz the European Investment Bank (EIB),
which has already, so to speak, crossed the gearing
ratio bridge. The EIB is capable of lending up to 250
per cent of its capital, which has recently been
increased from 7 to 14 bn EUAs. Its gearing ratio
therefore will permit the EIB to lend up to 250 per cent
of this amount or 36 bn EUA. Deducting loans
currently outstanding of nearly 14 bn EUA, leaves the
EIB with a lending capability of 22 bn EUA. Its
current bond issues have been in the region of 3 bn
EUA annually. It should be possible therefore to use
this increased capital base to raise say an additional
$1 bn annually and relend the amount on substantially
concessional terms if current amounts disbursed by
the European Commission to non-ACP countries as
grant aid, around 200 mn EUA, are all diverted to
interest subsidy purposes. In other words, using the
EIB's enhanced guarantee capability could convert a
modest amount of grant aid into a substantial multiple
of it for purposes of moderately concessional lending.
While the magnitudes involved do not of course mean
'massive transfers', the approach does expand the
transfer potential of available budgetary aid amounts.
This mechanism has been put to the Commission in
the context of lending for New and Renewable Energy
purposes and is under serious' consideration. More
ambitious proposals go beyond the notion of varying
existing guarantee capability to establish an explicit
large-scale fund for the channelling of 'massive
transfers' for desirable developmental purposes, in
particular to fill the prevailing gaps in the existing
financial structure. The design currently available for
discussion is of course the Brandt Commission's
World Development Fund, building up to an annual
lending programme of $20 bn at the end of a seven-
year period.
Proposals which seek to link official arrangements for
protecting the real value of OPEC assets with the
long-term financing of developing country deficits
through providing resources for a World Development
Fund surfaced more or less simultaneously in mid-
1980 in the Commonwealth Report [Arndt et al 1980
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ch 3 and Appendix 1], in what has come to be known
as the Gutowski/Roth Plan [Roth 1980], and in a
variant of this latter proposal put forward by the
European Parliament involving action initially at the
level of the European Community and the Gulf States
[EEC 1980].'
The Commonwealth Expert Group model implies
relatively modest protection for OPEC assets -
protection against exchange risks only - but also
places fewer demands on international cooperation in
general and on OPEC in particular [Arndt et al 1980;
Jayawardena 1980]. By the same token it has the
disadvantage of not going far enough by failing fully
to insure against the risk of periodic and unilateral
price action by OPEC countries as they seek to offset
the erosion in the real value of their assets through
inflation. The Commonwealth proposal proceeds
through a series of steps in financial inter-mediation
which we summarise as follows:
We strongly recommend that negotiations between
interested parties should commence without delay
to take the following steps: first, the provision of
facilities for reserve diversification by the oil-
exporting countries, whether through off-market
transactions which would, in effect, create a tier of
secondary reserve assets for the participating
central banks or through the proposed IMF
Substitution Account; second, the on-lending of
such funds via the IMF to developing countries on
suitable terms for financing their deficits; and
third, consideration of possible ways of making
this on-lending process the starting point for long-
term programme financing. A feasible mechanism
might be the negotiation between governments of
appropriate guarantee arrangements. This could
later be given permanent form by converting the
guarantees into the callable capital (in the sense of a
system of limited 'joint and several guarantees') of
a lending institution. [Jayawardena 1980:84]
The Gutowski/Roth Plan seeks to offer OPEC the
required greater degree of protection for its assets by
including additional measures designed to make the
value of oil underground fully equivalent to that of oil
converted into financial assets. This involves mutual
agreement on a steady annual rate of increase in the
real price of oil and on an equivalent real rate of return
on the financial assets, to be denominated in SDRs,
into which oil will have been converted. OPEC is
therefore fully protected against both inflation and
exchange risks. This greater benefit to OPEC is sought
to be traded against long-term assurances of supply
'Wolfgang Roth is aFederal German MP and Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Development of the Social Democratic Party, and Pro-
fessor Armin Gutowski is President of HWWA - Institut für
Wirtschaftsforschung, Hamburg. The Gutowski/Roth Plan is also
described in Wirtschaftsdiensr no 2, December 1980, Hamburg.
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and, of course, orderly price increases, and therefore
makes greater demands on OPEC than does the
Commonwealth proposal. The mechanics of the
Gutowski/Roth Plan imply offering OPEC annually
securities of up to $40 bn. These are in the nature of
10-year bonds convertible into cash after a minimum
period of notice assumed in the plan to be three
months. The dollars with which OPEC will pay for
these securities are invested by the institution
administering the plan in the international capital
markets. To the extent to which the return on the
dollar portfolio falls short of the inflation indexed
return guaranteed to OPEC, there will be a subsidy
burden on OECD budgets. An annual fraction of the
$40 bn (upwards of$lO bn) is earmarked for providing
resources to a World Development Fund for
subsidised lending to developing countries, and is not
available for investment in capital markets. This latter
subsidy benefitting developing countries would be
divided between OPEC and the OECD. The European
Parliament External Relations Committee's proposal
seeks in effect to reduce the Gutowski/Roth Plan to a
limited, sectional initiative on the part of the
European Community and the surplus Gulf states. All
three proposals provide, as mentioned, as an integral
part of their formulation, for longer term lending to
developing countries by finding substantial resources
for financing a World Development Fund.
The question that arises is whether in the current state
of the world economy any proposal along these lines
can have a reasonable chance of being negotiated. Let
me at the outset identify what seem to be areas of
inherent political implausibility in this category of
proposals. Firstly, any attempt to work out a long-
term agreement on the price of oil has the
implausibility that it may be thought of as derogating
from the national sovereignty of OPEC countries,
and, more particularly, of derogating from the
freedom OPEC would wish to have to link questions
of the oil price with a wider package involving both
international political and economic questions. For
this reason difficulties may arise in implementing the
Gutowski/Roth Plan as formulated, in particular the
attempt to link the real rate of return of OPEC assets
and the price of oil in the form of an explicit
agreement.
The second area of political implausibility relates to
the notion of anything savouring of a separate
political deal involving an assurance of oil prices and
supplies between apart, however significant, of OPEC
and a part of the OECD, namely the European
Community. Since pricing decisions would require the
involvement of all of OPEC, and since OPEC is
committed to deploying any leverage in the area of oil
on behalf of the entire Group of 77, any deal outside
the UN Global Round has an inherent political
weakness. It is difficult therefore to see clearly the lines
of a politically negotiated solution to both sets of
problems outside the proposed United Nations Global
Round where the opportunity would arise to deploy
Third World leverage in the area of energy -
temporary periods of softness in the oil market such as
today's notwithstanding - to negotiate a complex
package involving not only financing issues but those
relating to trade and transfer of technology as well, to
pick only two other areas.
A Role for the EEC
What I suggest could provide a basis for forward
movement would be an independent initiative that
would fashion, at the level of the European
Community for example, a financial instrument which
will provide an attractive medium for the investment
of developing country surpluses, and which goes
beyond the self-imposed limitation of the Common-
wealth Report by moving in the direction of a link with
OECD inflation rates. An SDR denominated bond
would have such an effect and would be an
appropriate basis for determining a positive real
interest rate. Such a proposal, in the absence of an
accompanying agreement on oil prices and supplies,
would not of course make OPEC completely
indifferent as between oil above ground and oil below
ground. But it could diminish appreciably the pressure
that will arise when OECD recovery occurs to restrict
supplies and charge the maximum market rate to
make up for past erosions in the real value of assets.
How can an initiative of this kind serve to safeguard
the future macro-economic well-being of the world
economy, in the absence of the parallel agreement with
OPEC that would alone guarantee a predictable price
of oil over the long term, but which I have ruled out as
possibly not negotiable in advance? The solution
might well consist in timing the introduction of a
sufficient volume of an inflation-indexed asset for a
moment of appropriate 'softness' in the oil market.
Certainly one way of ensuring the desired predictability
is to couple the introduction of the inflation-indexed
asset I have mentioned with an indication of the
minimum amounts likely to be offered annually for,
say, a five-year period, and with an announcement
that the annual offer will lapse if at any time the real
price of oil were to increase by more than a specific
annual percentage above that of a base line period. A
unilateral Community offer of this kind can only be
made during a period when the oil market is soft
enough for the base line price to be set at a level just
adequate to assist the 'energy transition' from non-
renewable to other forms of energy. If properly timed,
it should go far towards ensuring predictability in the
price of oil. The economic effect of such an initiative
can be expected, in fact, to be equivalent to that of the
oil price formula in the OPEC long-term strategy,
depending on the level at which the base line price is set
and the factors taken into account in determining the
minimum permissible annual increment in the real
price of oil.
If Europe were to be generous in a spirit of enlightened
self-interest, it might wish further to demarcate some
minimum portion of this offer in securities denomi-
nated in SDRs only - therefore carrying a guarantee
against exchange risk alone without any coverage for
inflation risk - on the condition that OPEC as a
grouping would implement that part of its long-term
strategy aimed at converting oil price increases beyond
a base line price into loans of varying concessionality
for oil-importing developing countries. This, it will be
recalled, sought to provide finance on varying terms to
countries at different levels of development. It sought
to give interest-free long-term loans to countries with
less than $300 per capita income importing less than
10,000 barrels a day of oil; concessional long-term
loans with a 25 to 50 per cent grant element to
countries with per capita income of between $300 and
$1,000 and oil imports of between 10,000 and 100,000
barrels a day; and to countries with aper capita income
of more than $1,000 and oil imports of more than
100,000 barrels a day it offered medium-term
commercial loans. The minimum volume of exchange
risk proof securities offered by the EEC could always
be equated to the concessional financing burden so
assumed by OPEC. The effect of such an arrangement
would be to maintain Third World purchasing power
and creditworthiness, which would benefit the
Community, while offering OPEC a significant
measure of protection.
If these two classes of security were to be offered
through an institution of the kind contemplated in the
Gutowski/Roth Plan, then the problem would be to
assure its solvency. This problem would arise if the
institution's liabilities in respect of interest payment
obligations were to exceed the return on the portfolio
of assets acquired by investing the dollars paid by
OPEC countries for their protected securities. One
problem which has complicated the further discussion
of the Gutowski/Roth Plan has been the prospect that
any such excess would become a subsidy burden
falling upon OECD governments. If, however, the
institution were authorised to invest its dollars in
equities which hedge against inflation as well as other
instruments, the institution's viability could be
ensured at the cost of some sacrifice in the ease with
which OPEC could convert their 'protected' securities
into cash. A trade-off could surely be found in a more
detailed formulation of this proposal which would
ensure the institution's financial viability, and a
balance between protection of value and liquidity for
the securities issued to OPEC so as to leave developed
55
country governments with a subsidy burden imputable
solely to the cost of lending under the World
Development Fund component of the proposal.
Under appropriate circumstances SDR creation could
finance any such subsidy amount without burdening
government budgets.
A balanced package involving the adaptation of the
Gutowski/Roth Plan to a 'soft' oil market situation is
outlined below in terms of the respective obligations of
the Community, of the institution administering the
plan (which might be the EIB) and of OPEC.
The Community's obligations The Community would
meet any interest subsidy cost on that portion of the
institution's assets devoted to lending to developing
countries. It would make a minimum issue of
exchange-risk protected securities in an amount
equivalent to the estimated annual volume of
concessional financing granted by OPEC to developing
countries to meet price increases above the base line oil
price. It would make a supplementary issue of both
exchange-risk and inflation-risk protected securities
which would lapse if the real price of oil increases
annually by a fixed percentage above the base line
price. It could keep institution building to a minimum
by issuing the protected securities through a window
of the EIB.
The institution's obligations The asset portfolio of the
institution will be distributed as between equities and
other assets in such a manner as to ensure an
acceptable combination of protection of value and
liquidity of the counterpart securities for OPEC so
that the fund becomes viable except for the subsidy
component on World Development Fund lending; the
limits to OPEC illiquidity ought to be capable of being
specified in advance.
OPEC's obligations OPEC would implement for
developing countries the proposals contained in its
long-term strategy for concessional financing of oil
imports. It would 'accept' the restrictions needed on
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encashing its protected securities if the financial
viability of the institution is to be preserved without a
subsidy on EEC budgets other than the amount
required to subsidise World Development Fund
lending; no prior agreement needs to be arrived at for
the reason that OPEC's, or for that matter other
surplus countries' 'absorption' of the securities will
depend on the balance provided between protection of
real value and liquidity, and there will be substantial
scope for varying both this balance and the amount
offered so as to equate supply and demand for the
securities.
This way of approaching the Gutowski/Roth Plan
would enable the Community to take a bold initiative
in the context of a 'soft' oil market, without entering
into complex negotiations exposing it to an
unpredictable financial risk, while simultaneously
conferring a benefit on OPEC, the developing
countries and, above all, on itself.
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